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A Judicial Response to the New Juvenile Code
J. BRANDON GRIFFIS*
This article will comment upon Indiana's Juvenile Code in general and
focus on particular areas of concern to a judge having juvenile jurisdiction.
The 1979 General Assembly recently adopted several amendments to
the Juvenile Code proposed by the Juvenile Justice Division and by
legislators from the -floor of the House. In continuing the Juvenile Justice
Division of the Judicial Study Commission in existence for an additional
year, the General Assembly charged it to consider the entire area of
delivery of services to children, amendments necessary to the Child
Abuse Law1 so as to make it consistent with the Code and to recommend
necessary amendments to the new Code. 2 While the vast majority of the
amendments are technical in nature, several are of substantive importance. Historically, members of the General Assembly have, on occasion, proposed hurriedly drafted amendments to carefully drafted legislation without due consideration of the ultimate effect. Some of these
amendments have been adopted, particularly those in reaction to emotional issues of the time. By its nature, a comprehensive Juvenile Code is
especially vulnerable to such amendments.
Another complication arises out of my having been a member of the
Division that drafted the Code and having participated in two years of
deliberation, including at times, intense debate. The active members of
the Commission developed a begrudging mutual respect for each other.
We fought among ourselves to bring forth a quality Code, and when that
had been achieved tended to become defensive of its provisions and
resentful of "outsiders" criticizing the Code even though as individual
members we fought hard against some of its provisions.
Hopefully with the help of considerable input from the Indiana Council
of Juvenile Court Judges, particularly from its Committee for the Improvement of Juvenile Justice, together with the passage of time, this article will reflect the reaction of a substantial number of Indiana's judges
having juvenile jurisdiction.
One of the greatest strengths of the Code was in its careful drafting
following the resolution of hard issues after full debate. This was coupled
with the fact that the Division held meaningful public hearings. These
meetings, held throughout the state, were advertised in advance. The
*LL.B. 1949, Indiana University. Past President, Indiana Council of Juvenile Court
Judges; former member, Judicial Study Commission; Judge, Wayne County Superior
Court.
'IND. CODE § 31-5.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979)(repealed 1979, new version at § 31-6-11).
2Id&§ 31-6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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meetings were well attended by interested persons generally, Commission members and staff. More importantly, the Commission listened to
the comments made at the meetings and responded to them in the final
drafting of the Code. This has not always been the case with Indiana's
Code Commissions. As a result, the Commission established a credibility
with the General Assembly. By the time the Code reached the floor for
vote, everything that could be said, had been voiced on several occasions.
The judicial impact upon the Code was far greater than intended. In
creating the Commission, the Legislature empowered the Chief Justice of
the Indiana Supreme Court to appoint three judges having juvenile
jurisdiction. This comprised the entire judicial representation of the
twenty-four member Commission. The appointments represented large,
medium and small counties: Allen, Wayne and Posey.
The Commission used as its basic working document the Proposed
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, a product of the Civil Code Study Commission, with those changes previously recommended by the Indiana Council
of Juvenile Court Judges (ICJCJ) and the Prosecuting Attorneys Council. This instrument was the descendant of a proposed code drafted in
1967 by Indiana juvenile court judges in response to the In re Gault, decision. Thus, the basic drafting document contained considerable judicial
influence.
Further, the ICJCJ Committee for the Improvement of Juvenile
Justice met regularly as the Commission deliberated. This Committee
studied and reacted to the preliminary and final drafts of the Code, communicating its reactions to the Division through the judicial members.
The Commission paid attention to the Committee's recommendations,
ultimately adopting many of them.
The Improvement Committee, composed of a cross-section of judges
having juvenile jurisdiction, reached its height of effectiveness by
meeting on four consecutive weekends in November and December of
1977. It reviewed the Code in its entirety and made final recommendations to the Commission. Again, the great majority of these were adopted
by the Commission and incorporated into the final version of the Code
submitted to the General Assembly which was later enacted into law
with minimal change.
Thus, a combination of several factors resulted in the enactment of a
Code into which there was substantial judicial input, contrary to the
legislative intent. Despite this the Code is not all to the judges' liking as
they both won and lost on major issues.
To fully appreciate the Code's ultimate effect it must be compared with
the state of juvenile justice in Indiana prior to the Code's effective date.
The present law is outdated, substantively and procedurally incomplete,
inartfully drafted and confusing. It addresses itself to the society existing at the conclusion of World War II. Only recently have the Indiana
3387

U.S. 1 (1967).
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courts of appeal become involved in the area of juvenile law. Such cases
are infrequent and are not necessarily by judges having had substantial
exposure to the juvenile system in practice.
An example is found in Seay v. State4 where the Indiana Court of Appeals set forth precise procedures necessary before jurisdiction may be
acquired by the juvenile court. These steps were not provided for in either
the applicable substantive or procedural laws and differed from the
actual practices of the trial judges.
As a result of all of these factors, the judges with juvenile jurisdiction
in each of the ninety circuits developed independent procedures, having
no uniform guidelines as to how the system should or should not be administered. Not only are the procedural steps inconsistent from circuit to
circuit, but the pleadings bear different names and police and probation
officers play varied roles with different responsibilities in each county.
Judge Robert Kinsey, first President of the ICJCJ, characterized sitting
as a special judge in a juvenile matter in another county as traveling to a
foreign land.
Indiana now has ninety different systems of juvenile justice, with no
circuit being capable of establishing that its system is the right way and
the others, wrong. It is not a state-wide system of justice. This is an intolerable situation. Had the criminal justice system reached such a state
of deterioration, it would have been quickly recognized and a hue and cry
raised. It would have received priority attention by the public, the Bar,
the General Assembly, the executive branch of state government and our
supreme court. Thus, there is more than just a need for a modern juvenile
code in Indiana. It is essential if it is to survive as a separate justice
system.
ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR

The Code officially gives the prosecutor a role in the decision as to
whether or not authorization should be sought to file a formal petition in
lengthy
juvenile court. 5 The Commission adopted this procedure after
6
debate and at the strong urging of the prosecutor members.
The decision to file a petition alleging delinquency rests with the prosecutor and the court shall authorize the filing if it finds probable cause
that the child is delinquent, and that it is in the best interests of the child
or the public interest that it be filed.7 The prosecutor, therefore,'assumes
a similar posture to that which he holds in the criminal justice system.
His discretionary decision to seek authorization or not is subject only to
a judicial determination of probable cause. 8
4

Seay v. State, -Ind. App.-,-, 337 N.E.2d 489, 498 (1975).
IND. CODE §§ 31-6-4-7, -9 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
6For a general discussion of the roles of the prosecutor, defense counsel and the judge,
5

see D. BESHAROV. JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY 41-53 (1974).
7

IND. CODE § 31-6-4-9(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'See id § 31-6-4-7(e)
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The problem lies not with this concept, but with a dichotomy existing
among Indiana's prosecutors. Some of the prosecutors now actively participate and want to continue to function in the juvenile justice system.
Some are not now involved and do not want to be in the future. Indiana's
prosecutors are evenly divided on this proposition according to representatives of the Prosecuting Attorney's Council. Members of the one
half maintain that all criminal acts and threats to public safety are their
ultimate responsibility; that victims of crime and the public do not
distinguish between criminal acts committed by adults or juveniles, and
they as prosecutors are held accountable to the electorate and thus must
be free to operate as a part of the system. The remaining prosecutors
maintain that the prosecution of adult crime occupies the full time of its
members and exhausts their limited resources; further, that the juvenile
justice system has been functioning well without prosecutorial intervention through the years and that the officers and agencies of both systems
are comfortable in this arrangement and it is best left alone.
Those favoring inclusion of the prosecutor in the juvenile system were
more emphatic than those preferring to remain outside the system,
therefore, ninety prosecutors are now an integral part of the system,
presumably including forty-five (more or less) reluctantly.
Judges readily accept the desirability of being relieved from the uncomfortable role of participating in the decision as to whether or not a petition should be filed as provided in current laws.9 The inconsistency of
making the decision to authorize the filing of a petition alleging delinquency and later sitting in judgment of that same decision is obvious.
And yet this has been the practice in Indiana for seventy-eight years.
Most judges welcome a reasonable alternative.
However, some apprehension arises by reason of the division among
the prosecutors. If Indiana's reluctant prosecutors are willing to devote
the time and make the effort to familiarize themselves with the
pecularities of the juvenile justice system, not only with the applicable
law, but also to recognize the sensitivity necessary to carry out the objectives of parens patriae and thus reach a professional level enjoyed by
their activist colleagues, all will be well. If not, one of the most important
decisions in the system will rest with one who does not command a
knowledge of the disciplines of the system. Of course, some prosecutors
will accept this new responsibility, commit themselves and perform it
well. Some will not. In those latter counties for the wrong reasons, some
juveniles will enter the formal system who ought not to do so. Some who
should enter it will not.
Another apprehension about the prosecutor's role in the decision to file
a petition with the court arises with the "status offenses." 10 Most
juvenile judges feel strongly that some of those young persons found to
9IND. CODE

§ 31-5-7-8 (1976)(repealed 1979).
§§ 31-6-4-1(a), -2 to -5 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

'IND. CODE

19791

JUDICIAL COMMENT

be incorrigible, truant and run-aways ought to remain in the juvenile
justice system, and that there is validity to the concept of curfew restrictions." It is their belief, gained from experience, that many status offenders are in desperate need of intervention that cannot be otherwise obtained. The selfish judicial position would be the contrary, to seek
removal of the status offender from the juvenile court. Removal, if accomplished, would not only ease the caseload of all juvenile judges, but
would also remove the responsibility of handling what is often the most
difficult of cases. How do you convince a truant to attend school? What if
he persists in truancy after one or more court appearances? Why did a
sixteen year-old girl leave her home? Why does she refuse to return? Why
can't the parents of a twelve-year-old control his behavior? What can the
court do about it? It well may be the juvenile judge's finest hour when he
applies the proper remedy to a status offender after utilizing available
diagnostic services, that accomplishes the rehabilitation of the child. The
truant returns to school; the incorrigible child and his parents forge out a
working relationship. This is parens patriae at work as it was originally
conceived.
The prosecutor, trained and experienced in criminal law, will quickly be
able to determine whether an act has occurred which would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult. His attention is focused upon criminal activity and he is responsive to acts threatening to the public order.
Now he must shift his thinking and be able to recognize and take
seriously the condition in which a child is found. Some "status offenders"
can be quickly and effectively handled by social agencies; some require
quick intervention by the court. Not only must the prosecutor be able to
differentiate between the two, but he must be aware of the available
private and public resources in the community and their particular areas
of expertise and effectiveness. He must gear himself to the particular
problems of the young if he is to respond effectively. He must have the
same determination to represent the state adequately to establish the
status in cases warranting intervention as he does where criminal-like activity has taken place and delinquency is alleged. If the status offender is
to remain in the system in fact, as well as in name, the prosecutor must
discipline himself to gain this new expertise. If not, we may have practically eliminated the status offenses from the system, a result not intended by the Division.
In fairness to those lawyers of prosecutorial bent, this concern arises in
part from contact with private defense counsel who enter the juvenile
court with minimal prior experience, having made no significant effort to
familiarize themselves with the system. Traditionally, this lawyer incorrectly refers to his young client as the "defendant," enters pleas of "not
"IND. CODE §§ 31-5-7-4.1(a), -5 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979)(repealed 1979). Curfew violation
laws are valid if they-are reasonable and intelligible as opposed to Indiana's present curfew
law.
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guilty" and files pleadings captioned "State of Indiana" versus his
client. He further misses the most important part of his representation in
not knowing the dispositional alternatives available to the court and thus
is in no position to "assist" the court in selecting a favorable disposition
least restrictive to the juvenile. He is a fish out of water with an unfortunate client. Hopefully he is well insured.
At this time there are very few attorneys from either the defense or
prosecutorial side who command knowledge of juvenile justice to the
degree expected of a professional.
Too MANY HEARINGS
The most frequent concern expressed by judges relates to the number
of hearings required by the Code. It is a legitimate concern, but one that
should be allayed with experience.
Other than Allen (which has a juvenile division of its family court),
Lake (Gary) and Marion (Indianapolis) counties, Indiana's juvenile
judges exercise general jurisdiction and are not "juvenile judges" in the
true sense. The great majority of Indiana judges exercise concurrent
criminal jurisdiction and as a result, conduct a multitude of hearings to
determine probable cause, arraign, establish bail, determine ability to
stand trial, dismiss, suppress evidence, and to consider pre-trial motions
such as motions in limine, discovery and the like. Following pre-trial conference, hearings take place out of the presence of the jury, and of course
if the verdict is of guilt include sentencing, a hearing on the request for
shock probation and if all else falls, a hearing on the post conviction relief
petition takes place. Is it any wonder that trial judges, equipped with
minimal staff, insufficient time and disgruntled civil litigants relegated
to the rear of the trial calendar, react adversely to a new phalanx of
hearings?
Although the Code requires certain hearings, it is important to keep in
mind that several can be combined and handled in a single court appearance. A detention or shelter care hearing is required within fortyeight hours of the taking into custody of an alleged delinquent 2 and
seventy-two hours of the taking into custody of a child in need of services,13 excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. This is a new
formal hearing to comply with minimum standards imposed by case
law.1 4 Standards for detention are, for the first time, set forth.15 While the
12

Id § 31-6-4-5(f) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'34Id. § 31-6-4-6(e).
1 Moss v. Weaver, 383 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Fla. 1974), modified 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.
1976). "No person can be lawfully held in penal custody by the state without a prompt
judicial determination of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment so provides and this
constitutional mandate applies to juveniles as well as adults. Such is the teaching of Gault
and the teaching of Kent." Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER. LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES §§ 8.1 - 8.10 (2d ed.

1974).
'"IND. CODE §§

31-6-4-5, -6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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hearing is new, detention decisions are now being made by various persons in the circuits, including in some, the judge. For these, it will not
constitute a new proceeding, but its format will change. The Code does
not contemplate that it be a lengthy, formal proceeding.
The initial hearing is comparable to a criminal arraignment. The Code
provides that the juvenile and his parents shall be advised as to the
allegations of the petition, their "rights" and the possible consequences
of an adjudication of delinquency. The juvenile shall then admit or deny
the allegations of the petition.1 6 Again, it is important to note that this
initial hearing may be combined with the dispositional hearing if the
allegations are admitted' 7 and will often constitute one judicial proceeding divided into two segments.
Similarly, upon the filing of a predispositional report, the court shall
hold a dispositional hearing.' 8 This should and frequently will be combined with the determination of the extent of parental participation. 9
This is an integral part of the disposition and there is no reason that
these cannot be treated at the same court appearance, except in unusual
circumstances.
The mandatory review of the dispositional decree 2 is, of course, new. It
is a recognition by the Commission of the inherent wrong in the
warehousing of people, whether adults within the mental health context
or juveniles within their particular system, and of the case law re2
sponding to that problem. 1
Many judges have been conducting periodic reviews in various forms
and at varying intervals. Again, this provision standardizes review
throughout the state and places on the state the burden of establishing
22
the need for continued jurisdiction with articulated criteria.
The Division originally proposed a "paper" review every six months
and a formal hearing with the juvenile present every eighteen months. In
an ill-considered action, the 1978 Legislature amended this to require the
formal hearing every six months if the child is removed from his custodian. For no other reason than the high per diem cost of placement, only a
small percentage of juveniles are removed and placed outside of their
home. Those who are removed have exhibited serious problems requiring
expensive custodial treatment. Few, if any, of these can be effectively
treated within a six-month period of time. The inevitable grapevine will
disclose to each placed juvenile that his case will be reviewed every six

'U& §§ 31-6-4-13, -13.5.
17Id. § 31-6-4-13.5(i).
8id. § 31-6-4-14(b).
19d. § 31-6-4-17.
20
IE § 31-6-4-19.
"Roose v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(N.D. Ala. 1971). See also BESHAROV. supranote 6, at 431; LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE
CASES. supra note 14, at 314.
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-19(b), -19(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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months and he will assume that he will then return home, thus, effectively crippling the treatment program. In an effort to compromise,
the Commission suggested that the formal review occur every twelve
months. The 1979 Legislature compromised, requiring a formal hearing
within nine months. It is admittedly a new hearing. There are bona fide
reasons for it, but as it now stands the intervals are too short, unrealistic
and unwise.
SECURE

v.

NON-SECURE DETENTION

A reasonably careful study of the trend throughout the country leads
to the conclusion that the non-secure detention of status offenders and
children in need of services is a fact of life, if not now, in the very near
future. Be that as it may, and without belaboring the wisdom of that
proposition, there are nagging reservations as to its full impact upon
those dealing directly with children and those also having the immediate
responsibility of handling children at various times of the day and night.
The problem of secure detention arises in two areas: first, the general
prohibition against the secure detention of any status offender; and second, the severe limitation upon the detention of the delinquent who has
committed an act otherwise a crime if committed by an adult.
The runaway child presents unique problems to the police officer and
the intake staff of the juvenile court. Indiana has experienced this for the
last three years. In 1976, the General Assembly designated the runaway
as a dependent child. Previously and appropriately, secure detention of
the traditional dependent child was prohibited; 23thus, the Assembly
brought the runaway child within this prohibition.
The runaway child challenges the system. When he is in hand, the
authorities are hard-pressed to determine his identity, his place of
residence and the reason for his having left. Is he truly only a runaway?
Or is he a fugitive from another jurisdiction? Is he fleeing from having
committed a criminal act? If placed in non-secure detention, will he accept this? Will he enter the front door and exit the rear door? If so, is it
reasonable to expect that the next jurisdiction will repeat this procedure
and thus, effectively move the child across our state from one county to
another?
There is strong judicial feeling of the need for a middle ground. Judges
do not advocate punitive detention for the classical runaway fleeing from
physical or sexual abuse or other threatening conduct on the part of a
parent or custodian.
The Legislature has adopted a forty-eight hour period of secure detention for the runaway child. This may be a reasonable compromise that
will allow the police and juvenile authorities an opportunity to identify
the child, contact parents and make an assessment of the circumstances
23
1IND. CODE

§ 31-5-7-5 (1976)(repealed 1979).
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surrounding the child, yet at the same time protect the true runaway who
ought to be in non-secure, shelter care.
A more fundamental reservation arising from the inability to detain
securely any status offender under any circumstances is the troublesome
recognition that, even if all else fails, there is no coercive power. Parents,
school administrators, social workers and others working directly with
young people turn to the juvenile courts for help and support when faced
with serious problems with the expectation that something can and will
be done. Accepting without reservation that community resources
should first be utilized in dealing with the incorrigible, truant and
runaway child, how does the court respond if the child thwarts those efforts? Is not effective authority an essential ingredient of any court? If
the court cannot coerce the unwilling child to participate in and avail
himself of treatment, the juvenile court has been emasculated and
relegated to the role of a referral agency, a task better handled by someone else. Again, we may have legislatively removed the status offender
from the juvenile justice system despite our declarations to the contrary.
Of equal concern is the practical elimination of any realistic possibility
including the child
of using secure detention for any adjudicated child,
24
found delinquent as part of a dispositional decree"
After extensive debate the Commission submitted to the General
Assembly a provision that juveniles who had been adjudicated as having
committed a delinquent act, otherwise a crime if committed by an adult,
could be committed to secure detention, although not commingled with
adults, for a period not to exceed thirty days. This was reduced by the
General Assembly to ten days. 25 At the same time a well intended amendment was also passed by the 1978 Legislature which credited toward that
ten days the time spent in secure detention by the juvenile prior to
disposition.
It is axiomatic that a large number of adjudicated delinquents for
whom the court would consider detention as a part of its disposition will
come from those detained awaiting trial. In those cases, detention will
become impossible.
However well-intentioned, the "good time" provision would tend to
become self-defeating and the 1979 Legislature removed it.
There may be a tendency to delay adjudication in a given case, thus
substituting pre-adjudication detention as the only form of detention,
although this is certainly not a result advocated by the Commission nor
intended by the Legislature. Likewise in those cases deemed serious by
the judge, a commitment to the Boys' or Girls' School becomes distinctly
more possible. Those "advocates of youth" who vehemently oppose even
limited detention of juveniles may advocate their wards out of short-term
local detention into the Boys' or Girls' School for the better part of the
year.
CODE § 31-6-4-16 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Delinquent child is defined in § 31-6-4-1.
11d. § 31-6-4-16(g)(5).

2'IND.

2
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It needs to be reiterated that most juvenile judges readily accept the
rehabilitative basis of parens patriae and seldom punish for
punishment's sake, using secure detention sparingly. It is, however, a
valid concept that reasonable punitive measures can be an effective part
of an overall rehabilitative program. Presently, defense counsel may offer
short-term (e.g., weekend) detention as an alternative to placement in the
Boys' or Girls' School. Obviously, this will no longer be available. The
General Assembly has thrown the baby out with its bath water.
The most compelling arguments against secure detention of delinquent
children arise from the obvious inadequacies of Indiana's jails. Many of
these are now being closed and replaced, and State attention and funding
are long over-due. This problem should be faced head-on and not indirectly avoided at the expense of our Juvenile Code.
THE QUESTION OF COST

A substantial judicial concern is the question of cost. How much will it
cost to implement the Code in the counties? Where will the money come
from? These are honest apprehensions based on past experience. Administration of the Code will cost more money, especially in the area of
shelter care. In a short time, many shelter care facilities must come into
existence.
This concept, however commendable and essential, strikes discordant
notes to the ears of beleaguered county councilmen who are saddled with
fixed tax rates, too many demands for money and local taxpayer
organizations. While many of them are concerned, compassionate people,
they have had little, if any, contact with the juvenile justice system and
picture juveniles referred to the court as "hoodlums" not deserving of
special treatment, particularly if it is costly. Trial judges accustomed to
dealing with local funding authorities have been living with "Proposition
13" for quite some time.
The track record of the State of Indiana is even less impressive. Being
nineteenth in per capita income, Indiana is entrenched at or near fiftieth
place in services to youth. In Indiana an adult committed to the Department of Corrections becomes its ward for all purposes. If a juvenile is so
committed the counties must bear one-half of the cost of state incarceration. There is no state financial support for foster care or probation services. All costs of defense, adult or juvenile, must be borne locally. Lotteries and theft being illegal, the judge faces this stark financial picture.
In many counties existing personnel can fill the roles contemplated by
the Code; in some, staff additions will be required. Soon, Indiana must
join its sister states in providing reasonable funding of services to
youths, including assistance for the development of shelter care facilities.
In the interim, its juvenile judges will be caught between a Code mandating improved juvenile care and a state unwilling to match its mandate
with its money. There is no present answer to the questions of cost and
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source of funding. Indiana simply cannot continue to require more services without providing the financial ability to pay for them.
THE POSITIVE SIDE
There are specific provisions in the Code that will be very helpful to the
judges and which will be met with judicial favor. For instance, the expansion of the narrow definitions of the neglected" and dependent child 27 by
the creation of the "child in need of services, 28 couched in broader terms,
will make intervention simpler, particularly in those cases that do not fit
within the narrow confines of the old definitions. This will be particularly
true in those cases in which the child is in obvious need of intervention
but there is either no evidence of parental fault or there is insufficient
evidence to establish it.
The ability to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child 29 to act on
behalf of the child should be welcomed in two areas. First, the parent
seeking to dump the custody of the child upon the state is no stranger to
the juvenile courts. This parent engages counsel ostensibly for the child,
whose first loyalty is to the parents. As a result the child is in fact
unrepresented. Not only may the court appoint a guardian for this child,
but it has an affirmative duty to provide counsel representing the child's
3 1
exclusive interests.2 0 This is a result intended by Gault
Secondly, the appointment of a non-attorney guardian ad litem can be
of great assistance to the attorney caught between his role as an advocate seeking dismissal of the petition against his client, who he knows
is in serious need of care and treatment. Does he represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law, and if so, to what extent? Does he
oppose the intervention that will result in his client receiving needed services? It is a particularly uncomfortable position for the attorney. The
guardian ad litem, not necessarily a professional advocate, can join in
this decisionmaking process and thereby ease the dilemna faced by
counsel.
The judges attention is called to the section enabling the court to order
the child to undergo medical examination and treatment both prior to
and after adjudication, including the power to detain the child for such
purposes.23 Following adjudication, the court's dispositional powers are
23
quite broad in providing for care and treatment found to be necessary
The legal authority to issue broad protective orders is new to the juvenile
justice system and is designed to give the judge the ability to react to
26

IND. CODE § 31-5-7-6 (1976)(repealed 1979).

27

AId§ 31-5-7-5 (1976)(repealed 1979).
'IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

"Id.§ 31-6-3-4.
3

IlJ § 31-6-3-1(B)(1); id § 31-6-7-2.

21387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2
3 1ND. CODE § 31-6-7-12 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
33

Id.
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emergency situations to protect the child and the court's jurisdiction. 4
This is consistent with his power in similar family matters under the
35
Dissolution of Marriage Act.
The placing of venue in the county where the delinquent act occurred as
well as in the county of residence, 36 will be of assistance to the court,
police officers, victims and witnesses. Prior law fixed venue at the county
of residence or where the child was found.3 7 Thus a juvenile residing in
Gary who committed an act in central Indiana and was apprehended at
Evansville could only be tried in Lake or Vanderburg counties, at considerable expense and great inconvenience. The fact-finding hearing can
now be held in the central Indiana county. The Code further enables the
assignment of the case to the county of residence for disposition.3 8 Two
things can be accomplished by this procedure: the county of residence
will bear the cost of placement or other services; and importantly, the
disposition of the child will tend to be more consistent with the disposition of others with whom he comes into contact.
Emancipation in whole or part now becomes a dispositional alternative.3 9 In those situations where the mature juvenile's best interest lies
in severing ties with the prostitute mother, or abusive father, the court
can now accomplish this. It is new, creative and will gain in usage.
Of the specific provisions in the Code, the ability to compel parental
participation in the process of family rehabilitation 40 may constitute the
Code's high water mark in the eyes of the judges. The present inability to
treat the obvious source of the problem is extremely frustrating to judges
and probation staff. Many have bluffed parents into counseling on
limited occasions, running the risk of encountering defiance or noncompliance. It is an impossible position in which to place the court. The
Code recognizes this and provides overdue, necessary legal tools.
Hopefully, the case for uniformity and a truly state-wide system of
justice has been made. There exists in the Code an inherent element that
protects the judges. It legitimizes what our judges have been doing in
many instances. In trying to fit an inadequate and outdated accumulation of enactments to the problems of the times, judges have required examinations, testing, parental participation, restitution and other dispositional alternatives without clear-cut authority and at some personal and
professional risk. The Code recognizes this and gives to juvenile courts
the needed clear-cut authority. It is a vote of confidence in our juvenile
courts and the system in general.
The juvenile justice system is alive and well and lives in Indiana.
3

Id. § 31-6-7-14.
See id. § 31-1-11.5-7.
3
-1d. § 31-6-7-7.
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1ND. CODE § 31-5-7-8 (1976)(repealed 1979).
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IND. CODE § 31-6-7-8 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1d. § 31-6-4-16(e)(5).
Id § 31-6-4-17.
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